Pavel Durov Accuses Reliance of Sabotaging Telegram Using BGP Hijacking Outside India, Urges Action After Ignored Reports

By | June 16, 2026

Pavel Durov, the founder and CEO of Telegram, has accused India’s telecom giant Reliance of intentionally sabotaging access to Telegram for millions of users outside India—an allegation that, if accurate, suggests a coordinated effort to disrupt the messaging service far beyond national borders.

The core claim revolves around a specific technical method known as BGP hijacking. BGP, or Border Gateway Protocol, is a routing system used by internet service providers and network operators to decide how traffic flows across the internet. When BGP is “hijacked,” an unauthorized party (or compromised network configuration) can improperly advertise routes so that traffic intended for one network is rerouted through another. In practice, BGP hijacking can lead to outages, slowdowns, or complete loss of connectivity to targeted services—because users’ traffic is directed away from the legitimate infrastructure that should deliver the service.

Durov’s assertion is that Reliance is using a rogue approach to carry out this interference, affecting Telegram users in countries outside India, including the United Arab Emirates. The allegation suggests that the issue is not confined to India’s internal connectivity environment, but instead may be tied to how international routing is handled through telecom and internet transit networks associated with Reliance.

According to the story framing, the disruption is believed to be widespread, impacting “millions of users” rather than a small, isolated group. The scale is central to the accusation: it implies a pattern that is persistent enough to be detected, discussed, and repeatedly reported, rather than a one-off network incident. Durov’s position is that the interference appears intentional—rather than accidental—because there have been multiple reports and yet the problems have allegedly continued or not been adequately addressed.

The narrative emphasizes that Reliance has ignored these reports. That detail is important because it distinguishes the situation from typical operational mistakes. Network problems can happen due to misconfigurations, equipment failures, or routing errors. However, when repeated reports are raised and connectivity continues to break in similar ways, the argument for intentional sabotage becomes stronger. In this account, the continued impact despite warnings is presented as evidence that the interference may be deliberate.

While the story is technical on its surface, it is essentially about trust, openness, and the fragility of global internet routing. Telegram relies on a set of infrastructure endpoints and routing pathways that must be accessible worldwide. If a major telecom provider or network operator can influence international routes—especially through BGP-level changes—then a messaging platform can become effectively unreachable for affected users. That makes BGP hijacking a particularly serious allegation because it can be difficult for end users to diagnose directly. It typically requires network-level investigation by experts, monitoring systems, and operators that observe the routing decisions made in real time.

In the account attributed to Durov, the allegation is that Reliance’s actions are not merely causing random disruptions, but are systematically interfering with access to Telegram. Because BGP operates at the level of internet routing between autonomous systems, the consequences can be complex: some networks might route correctly while others are rerouted incorrectly, and the resulting connectivity problems can appear uneven across regions, mobile carriers, or local internet providers.

The story further suggests that the sabotage might be connected to competition between services. It is framed as potentially part of a competitive “war,” where an incumbent or dominant company tries to undermine a rival platform by restricting access. In many countries, telecom operators can become gatekeepers to connectivity, and—whether through policy, technical manipulation, or commercial pressure—can influence which digital services are easier to reach and which are harder to access.

This is why the accusation resonates: it implies that the competition is not being fought solely through product features, user experience, or marketing, but through control of the network layer itself. If Telegram access is selectively disrupted by hijacking routing paths, that would mean users might be deprived of a competitor not because of consumer choice, but due to how internet traffic is forcibly redirected.

The story’s focus on “outside India (including the UAE)” implies that users who do not have any direct political or regulatory relationship to India could still experience connectivity problems. This broadened impact is a key component of the allegation: it suggests that the effects of a single provider’s routing decisions can travel internationally, depending on how cross-border network connectivity is configured.

The claim that the sabotage is intentional also raises broader questions about accountability. When a network operator is reported to be causing harmful routing interference, the expectation is that it would investigate, correct configuration issues, cooperate with affected parties, and prevent recurrence. In the narrative, Reliance allegedly did not do so, leaving the implication that the interference might not be a simple technical defect.

Telegram’s perspective is that the disruption is unacceptable and that the issue warrants attention from the relevant authorities, internet governance bodies, and infrastructure stakeholders. In similar past incidents globally, authorities and experts have had to untangle whether alleged BGP hijacking or routing manipulation is accidental or malicious. Determining intent often depends on evidence such as repeated patterns, the timing of routing changes, the consistency of the affected routes, and whether operators take corrective action after being notified.

Durov’s allegation, as presented here, hinges on the combination of three factors:

1) The method: BGP hijacking, a routing-level technique that can selectively break access.
2) The target: Telegram, which relies on global connectivity and is vulnerable to routing interference.
3) The persistence and inaction: multiple reports allegedly ignored by Reliance, reinforcing the argument that the interference is deliberate.

The story also highlights the geopolitical and commercial dimension of the problem. If the sabotage is indeed tied to competitive pressure, it indicates that companies controlling major parts of the connectivity infrastructure could potentially use routing manipulation to disadvantage specific digital services. This would have implications for net neutrality principles and for the general expectation that the internet should operate as an interconnected, neutral transport system rather than a selectively managed service ladder.

There is also an underlying user impact: for millions of users, a messaging service that suddenly fails to connect can affect communication, work, emergency coordination, and daily personal interactions. While technical disruptions might look temporary or localized, the story describes the issue as ongoing and large-scale. That means users may experience intermittent messaging failures, inability to load Telegram resources, or complete connection loss, depending on how routing changes affect different carriers and regions.

The story’s framing suggests that Telegram has likely sought to bring attention to the network-level interference so that corrective steps can be taken. It also implies that the evidence is strong enough for Durov to publicly name Reliance and accuse it of sabotaging access using a rogue method.

In addition, the allegation that Reliance has ignored multiple reports points to a breakdown in dispute resolution. In standard network incident workflows, operators respond to reports—especially those that indicate potential malicious routing activity—by reviewing logs, adjusting configurations, contacting peers, and verifying that correct routes are advertised. The claim here is that those remedial steps were not effectively taken, allowing the problem to persist.

The story ultimately leaves readers with a serious question: if a telecom provider can manipulate international routing to undermine a platform abroad, what safeguards exist to prevent similar actions for other services? The internet’s routing architecture is distributed and complex, but it also relies on trust among network operators. When a powerful operator’s behavior is alleged to violate that trust, the consequences extend beyond one company’s commercial interests.

According to the account, Durov believes the sabotage may be part of a competitive struggle. Telegram’s allegation can be interpreted as a warning that network-level interference could become a tactic in the digital economy, where control over connectivity becomes a weapon rather than a neutral utility. This adds urgency to calls for independent investigation and technical transparency.

While the story excerpt does not provide extensive procedural details such as the specific dates of BGP events or the technical routing evidence, its central message is clear: Durov accuses Reliance of using BGP hijacking to sabotage Telegram access outside India, affecting millions of users including in places like the UAE, and he says the pattern appears intentional because Reliance allegedly ignored multiple reports.

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